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Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and Human Rights:  
The Importance of National and Intra-Organizational Pressures 
  Abstract 
The growing global prominence of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) brings new dimensions to 
our understanding of multinational corporations (MNCs) and human rights issues. This paper constructs 
a three-level framework that enables the mapping of transnational, national, and intra-organizational 
human rights pressures, and uses this framework to identify and analyse the human rights that Chinese 
SOEs report concern with.  The analysis provided suggests that whilst China’s most global SOEs are 
subject to transnational pressures to respect all human rights, such pressures appear outweighed by those 
encouraging them to concentrate upon only some human rights – i.e. economic, social and cultural 
rights – within their national and intra-organizational environment. The paper concludes by identifying 
a number of ways in which our conceptual framework and empirical findings can inform future 
research.  
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Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and Human Rights:  
The Importance of National and Intra-Organizational Pressures 
The policies and practices of multinational corporations (MNCs) relevant to human rights are 
increasingly discussed within a number of overlapping literatures: e.g. business and society, business 
ethics, corporate social responsibility (CSR), international law (Wettstein, 2012). By and large, these 
writings concentrate on normatively prescribing the human rights obligations of MNCs (e.g. Arnold, 
2010), or on describing the ways in which changes in the global environment have contributed to human 
rights and CSR concerns becoming increasingly connected (e.g. Kobrin, 2009). In particular, the 
development of the United Nations’ (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie, 
2011), which posits that MNCs have the duty to ‘respect’ human rights, and that states have the duty to 
‘protect’ human rights and ‘remedy’ human rights concerns (Ruggie, 2008), has been the subject of 
considerable commentary (e.g. McCorquodale, 2009; Whelan, Moon & Orlitzky, 2009). 
Although the broad literature on MNCs and human rights is marked by increasing sophistication, it 
arguably lacks nuance when it comes to acknowledging that MNCs are commonly subject to competing 
human rights pressures. Indeed, even those who argue that MNCs operate within fragmented 
institutional environments, and that MNCs face different CSR pressures (e.g. regarding animal rights, 
climate change, corruption, sweatshops) at different levels of analysis, tend to emphasize that MNCs 
operate within an environment that acknowledges and promotes the universality of human rights in a 
more or less univocal fashion (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007, p. 852; Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin, 2008, p. 998). 
Two overlapping considerations help explain this emphasis. First, the literature on CSR – and 
‘political’ CSR as opposed to political CSR in particular (see Whelan, 2012) – has tended to argue that 
we now live in a world in which local and national pressures are of decreasing importance, and in which 
transnational pressures from transnational actors who commonly advocate and promote human rights 
(e.g. international non-government organizations like Amnesty International, inter-governmental 
organizations like the UN), are increasingly important (e.g. Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Second, there has been a tendency for the MNC and human rights literature to concentrate on the 
policies and practices of MNCs with Western ‘home’ states. These ‘home’ states – and the citizens 
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thereof – often promote the universality of human rights even though they are not always paragons of 
virtue with regards thereto, or even signatories to all of the major human rights initiatives. Thus, the 
United States (US) government played a key role in establishing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but is yet to ratify one of its major ‘offshoots’, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). More specifically, the US government has played a key role in 
“promoting various voluntary CSR initiatives” (Aguilera et al. 2007, p. 849), multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (Rasche, 2012) and international accountability standards (Gilbert, Rasche & Waddock, 
2011) that promote human rights, and that US (and other) MNCs commonly participate within (e.g. the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights focused on the extractive industries; the Global 
Network Initiative, focused on information and communication technology companies). 
The underlying point is that, whilst “the multiplicity of actors currently involved in… global [CSR] 
accountability standards” has been noted more generally (Jamali, 2010, p. 628), the multiplicity of 
voices that exist with regard to the human rights responsibilities of MNCs, remains largely ignored.  
Additionally, and despite the MNC-human rights problematic being intimately related to various nation-
states being unable or unwilling to promote human rights domestically, there is a common presumption 
that national and transnational pressures strongly encourage MNCs to at least profess their concern to 
‘fill’ these ‘governance gaps’ (Ruggie, 2008). 
This general understanding, however, is rendered increasingly problematic by the re-emergent 
power of non-Western countries that do not always acknowledge the universality of human rights, and 
that commonly emphasize the importance of state sovereignty (e.g. Chan, Lee & Chan, 2008; Waddock, 
2008, p. 106). And, it is rendered further problematic by the fact that MNCs are organizational 
environments that can have internal pressures that may not be consistent with those of their transnational 
environment (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). 
With such concerns in mind, this paper identifies and analyses the competing pressures that Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are currently subject to as regards human rights responsibilities. Most 
notably, and on the basis of an empirical analysis of their reported human rights concerns, the paper 
argues that the transnational pressures that encourage Chinese SOEs to acknowledge all human rights, 
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are currently outweighed by those within their national and intra-organizational environment 
encouraging them to concentrate upon only some human rights. 
In making this argument, the paper is structured as follows. First, the business ethics, CSR and 
institutional theory literatures are used to construct a three-level framework for mapping the various 
human rights pressures that MNCs are subject to.  Importantly, it is recognized that because MNCs have 
headquarters in their home states and subsidiaries in host states (Kobrin, 2009, pp. 356-358), the 
transnational, national and intra-organizational levels that are distinguished between, are more or less 
always interrelated.  Second, the framework is applied to Chinese SOEs affiliated with the central arm 
of SASAC (i.e. the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), and 
it is suggested that whilst Chinese SOEs are subject to similar transnational human rights pressures as 
all other MNCs, they are also subject to specific and overlapping national and intra-organizational 
human rights pressures as a result of their being controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
(Chan, 2009). More substantively, it is argued that whereas the transnational CSR environment is 
characterized by pressures emphasizing the importance of all human rights – i.e. those contained within 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) – the national and intra-organizational 
network of Chinese SOEs is only characterized by pressures emphasizing the importance of some 
human rights:  those within the ICESCR.  
Following this, the paper outlines its methods; provides a discussion of its findings with regard to 
the reported human rights commitments of China’s ten most global SOEs; and argues that the SOEs 
appear less influenced by the pressures of the transnational environment than they do their national and 
intra-organizational environment. The paper concludes with a discussion of the wider importance of its 
findings, and makes a number of suggestions as to how these findings can inform future research. 
Three Levels of Human Rights Pressures: A Framework 
MNCs face various pressures to discharge human rights responsibilities. Whilst the full extent of 
these duties is the subject of an important normative debate (e.g. Smith, 2013; Wettstein, 2012, 2013; 
Whelan, 2012, 2013), this paper is interested in the positive (i.e. descriptive or explanatory) aspects of 
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MNCs and human rights theorizing. In particular, the present section differentiates between three levels 
of human rights pressure on MNCs: the transnational, national and intra-organizational levels. 
By pressures, the paper refers to the ways in which different actors seek to force or encourage MNCs 
to comply with a given set of behavioural norms, to reconstruct or amend their policies, or to somehow 
alter their practices (Oliver, 1991; see also Jamali, 2010). Such pressures can be driven (or motivated) 
by various considerations (e.g. aesthetic, instrumental, moral), and can take various forms (e.g. they can 
be more coercive or persuasive). Further, different pressures can be complementary (e.g. human and 
labour rights) or conflicting (e.g. pressures relating to animal rights and the professional interests of 
abattoir workers), and will often be resisted. 
Human rights pressures more specifically, refer to the fact that MNCs are currently subject to various 
pressures that encourage them to impact upon human rights in various ways. Although these pressures 
can take numerous forms – e.g. laws, moral arguments, pragmatic demands – it is their variable scope 
that is more important for the present purpose. Specifically, a distinction is made between those 
pressures that encourage MNCs to respect all of the rights, and those that encourage MNCs to respect 
only some of the rights, listed within the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’: i.e. the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 
1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) 
(Morsink, 1999). 
These pressures operate in the context of three key developments.  First, they are contextualized by 
the increasingly widespread recognition that MNCs can enable or undermine what amounts to all human 
rights (Ruggie, 2011). Thus, MNCs (e.g. Coca-Cola) now have policies that prohibit the use of forced 
labour within their supply chains, and guidelines on how to responsibly ‘manage’ the involuntary 
resettlement/forced displacement of peoples (e.g. Shell, Statoil). In short, MNCs increasingly recognize 
responsibilities for human rights concerns that, until recent times, were generally considered the 
exclusive domain of states (Whelan, Moon & Orlitzky, 2009). 
Second, these pressures are contextualized by the manner in which notions of state sovereignty can 
conflict with pressures encouraging MNCs to promote or respect all human rights. In other words, 
MNCs, and other organizations, are also subject to pressures that promote the ability of states to set 
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laws within their borders, and that enable them to ‘pick and choose’ between the human rights they 
wish to promote or respect. Further, such inter-governmental organizations as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN, sometimes promote, in a seemingly 
contradictory fashion, both all human rights and state sovereignty (OECD, 2011; UN, 1945). 
Finally, these pressures are shaped by the fact that MNCs can be directly and indirectly responsible 
for undermining or disrespecting human rights. MNCs are directly responsible for human rights abuses 
when their immediate activities (e.g. employment contracts) are the source of concern. In contrast, they 
are indirectly involved or complicit in “human rights abuses” “where the actual harm is committed by 
another party, including governments and non-State actors”, that they are (contractually) involved with 
(Ruggie, 2008, paras. 73-81).  Whilst it might be thought that MNCs are more likely to be subject to 
human rights pressures that relate to their direct than indirect responsibilities, this is not necessarily the 
case. For example, many multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g. the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, the Global Network Initiative) encourage MNCs to avoid being complicit in (civil and 
political) human rights abuses, and many MNCs (e.g. Coca-Cola) express their concern to avoid being 
complicit for a whole variety of (civil and political) human rights (e.g. the right to not be subjected to 
slavery). Accordingly, the paper makes no distinction between direct and indirect human rights 
responsibilities, and does not suggest whether or not MNCs are more likely to be directly or indirectly 
responsible for one human right or another. Rather, human rights pressures are simply conceived as 
encompassing those pressures that relate to the posited direct and indirect responsibilities of MNCs 
more generally (e.g. Ruggie, 2008). 
Transnational Human Rights Pressures 
Transnational human rights pressures transcend the confines of a given nation-state and other 
nationally-based actors. They tend to derive from intergovernmental organizations, international non-
government organizations (NGOs), and new governance structures such as multi-stakeholder initiatives 
or international accountability standards (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2007, pp. 850-853; Gilbert, Rasche & 
Waddock, 2011; Rasche, 2012). Given the continued absence of a global sovereign, and the difficulties 
of reaching agreement on matters of international law, transnational human rights pressures rarely take 
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a ‘hard’ or coercive form. Rather, they tend to be of a ‘softer’ status, or tend to encourage national actors 
to impose ‘harder’ pressures upon those other actors they can control (Kobrin, 2009, p. 361). 
Prominent examples of international NGOs who encourage MNCs to acknowledge and further 
human rights include Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Prominent examples of 
transnational initiatives that pressure MNCs to address human rights (and that international NGOs are 
commonly somehow involved in), include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 
2011), the UN Global Compact (UNGC), and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (Ruggie, 2011).  This last initiative has recently been termed the “state of the art in the debate 
on business and human rights” (Wettstein, 2012, p. 741), and thus provides a good example of how 
transnational human rights pressures commonly encourage MNCs to acknowledge, and act upon, the 
importance of all human rights. As the twelfth Guiding Principle states: 
“Because business enterprises can have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of 
internationally recognized human rights, their responsibility to respect allies to all such rights… 
An authoritative list of the core internationally recognized human rights is contained in the 
International Bill of Human Rights…., coupled with the principles concerning fundamental rights 
in the eight ILO [International Labour Organization] core conventions  as set out in the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” (Ruggie, 2011). 
Given the present concern with (positive) empirical theorizing, only a number of overlapping points 
need to be noted with regard to the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework here. First, in advocating 
that MNCs (and other business enterprises) should ‘respect’ human rights, Ruggie emphasizes that 
MNCs should “do no harm” (Ruggie, 2008, para. 24). Whilst this posited duty requires MNCs to take 
positive steps to ensure that they avoid being directly or indirectly responsible for human rights abuses, 
it is basically a negative duty that does not require MNCs to ensure that al human rights are ‘protected’ 
or that all human rights concerns are ‘remedied’.  
The duties to protect human rights and remedy human rights concerns, on the other hand, falls to 
states (Ruggie, 2008). To discharge these two duties, states are required to put measures in place that 
encourage (or force) MNCs to ‘respect’ human rights, and to establish structures that redress those 
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instances in which ‘respect’ is lacking. Importantly, the state duty to ‘protect’ human rights is arguably 
most pronounced with regard to SOEs because:  
“In principle, inducing a rights-respecting corporate culture should be easier to achieve in State-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Senior management in SOEs is typically appointed by and reports to 
State entities. Indeed, the State itself may be held responsible under international law for the 
internationally wrongful acts of its SOEs if they can be considered State organs or are acting on 
behalf, or under the orders, of the State” (Ruggie, 2008: para. 32). 
Whilst we consider the UN Guiding Principles a good illustration of the fact that MNCs are subject 
to transnational pressures encouraging them to acknowledge (and somehow promote) all human rights, 
we note that various actors are commonly critical of their underlying ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
framework (see Whelan, Moon & Orlitzky, 2009). MNC and human rights scholars such as Arnold 
(2010) and human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International, for example,  have expressed concern 
as to what Wettstein (2012) suggests are the relatively modest demands that Ruggie’s framework makes 
of MNCs and states. Nevertheless, many of these same critics agree that Ruggie’s framework is right 
to emphasize the importance of all human rights. 
National Human Rights Pressures 
National human rights pressures are those that are more or less readily associated with a given state 
or with a given national population. In terms of the latter, it is clearly possible for a given population to 
place normative and/or material pressure on MNCs to acknowledge and act upon a set of human rights 
duties (e.g. through consumer boycotts, media advocacy, protests). Further, it is possible for specific 
elements of a population to place such pressure on MNCs (e.g. nationally-based activists and NGOs). 
Whilst the pressures that a national population (or parts thereof) put on MNCs are important, the 
human rights pressures that states (or governments) can put on MNCs are often more immediate, and 
less diffuse, due to states being in a position to coerce, or strongly encourage, MNCs, to discharge 
various human rights duties (e.g. Aguilera et al. 2008, p. 848).  Amongst other things, states can 
encourage or require MNCs to report on their human rights policies and practices as a means by which 
to encourage a ‘rights respecting’ culture (Ruggie, 2008: para. 30). Further, states can align the awarding 
of government contracts with the need for strong human rights policies and practices; and they can seek 
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to ensure that their national laws, and the international regimes they participate within more generally, 
encourage MNCs to respect all human rights (e.g. Ruggie, 2011). 
Although states can exert pressures on corporations of any nationality, the present interest is in the 
pressures that states put on ‘home’ MNCs whose ‘parent’ is incorporated within, or has headquarters 
(HQ) within, their national boundaries. On the one hand, then, these national pressures are conceived 
as sometimes having an ‘extraterritorial effect’ (Ruggie, 2008, para. 14) because MNC’s have 
subsidiaries located in foreign ‘host’ countries (e.g. Zerk, 2006, pp. 51-52). On the other hand, however, 
these national pressures are defined so as to exclude the pressures that host states put on MNC 
subsidiaries whose ‘parent’ is located within another ‘home’ country. 
In addition to their morally benefitting from the inherent value of doing the ‘right’ thing, states can 
potentially derive material benefit (e.g. in terms of national competitiveness, risk minimization) by 
pressuring their home MNCs to respect all human rights (e.g. Aguilera et al. 2007, pp. 848-850; Ruggie, 
2008, paras. 27, 32; Ruggie, 2011, prin. 2). Whilst states such as the USA (Clinton, 2010) and the UK 
(UKFCO, 2011: 71) commonly suggest that they follow this general logic, many do not.  
The CCP, for instance, can only ever mention the universality and indivisibility of human rights at 
the risk of self-contradiction, and thus tends to suggest that different societies should emphasise 
different, or some, human rights, as a result of their differing cultural, economic and political contexts 
(e.g. Deng, 2008, pp. 271-272). State sovereignty, on the other hand, is an ideal that is broadly aligned 
with the CCP’s interests. Accordingly, the CCP tends to emphasize it alongside the importance of some 
more than all human rights, in its various global governance statements and activities (e.g. Chan, Lee 
& Chan, 2008), and in the pressures it places on Chinese MNCs (see below). 
Intra-Organizational Human Rights Pressures 
In addition to being situated within transnational and national environments, “all units in MNCs” 
(i.e. both MNC HQs and their foreign subsidiaries) can be “viewed as belonging to the same intra-
organizational institutional field, which is contained within the boundaries of the firm” (Kostova, Roth 
& Dacin, 2008, p. 998). Such fields are generally easy to recognize: for they are characterized by 
“formal authority structure[s]” in which “subunits are… dependent on the parent company… for critical 
resources” (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008, p. 998). 
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MNCs as a whole, or their separate sub-units, face internal pressures that encourage them to manage 
their response to external (e.g. national or transnational) pressures. Pressures relating to profitability, 
reputation and risk management for example, often encourage MNCs to ‘decouple’ (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) their actual practices from any accountability standards that external pressures (e.g. from 
international non-government organizations) have encouraged them to join (Jamali, 2010). 
Just as national pressures commonly derive from the moral and material objectives of nation-states, 
so too do intra-organizational pressures commonly derive from the moral and material objectives, and 
get shaped by the corporate governance structures (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), of an MNC’s HQ. As 
with CSR policies and practices more generally (Whelan, 2012, pp. 716-718), the human rights policies 
and practices of MNCs tend to be strongly influenced by their owners’ interests and their formal 
organizational apparatus. 
As these points suggest, analyses of the intra-organizational environment of SOEs need to identify 
the interests (material and/or moral) of the owning nation-state (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2010, p. 523; 
Néron & Norman 2008, p. 8; Shen & Lin, 2009, p. 444). Furthermore, such analyses need to 
acknowledge that these intra-organizational pressures can promote either all or some of the human 
rights listed in the International Bill of Rights, and that these intra-organizational pressures may or may 
not be consistent with national and transnational pressures.  
The interrelated nature of these different pressures is illustrated in figure 1. 
-- Insert Figure 1 about Here – 
Placing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Within The Three-Level Framework 
Although there is an emerging body of work on China and CSR (e.g. Kong, Liu & Dai, 2012; Moon 
& Shen, 2010; Noronha, Tou, Cynthia & Guan, 2013), the relationship between Chinese SOEs and 
human rights remains largely unexplored. Further, the wider business and society literature is yet to 
reflect the growing global prominence of Chinese SOEs (e.g. Fortune, 2013; UNCTAD, 2011). In light 
of such, the present analysis specifically focuses on those Chinese SOEs placed under the control of 
SASAC. SASAC, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (of 
the People’s Republic of China), was established to perform the “responsibilities of investor” for 
China’s leading and most international SOEs (SASAC, 2003; also see Naughton, 2011, pp. 317-318). 
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At the time of writing, SASAC is the nominal owner of about 120 of China’s largest SOEs, and is the 
nominal owner of the vast majority of the 95 Chinese MNCs featured on the Fortune Global 500 in 
2013. SASAC SOEs are thus a very important part of the global economic landscape. 
Transnational Human Rights Pressures 
Like other MNCs, SASAC SOEs are embedded within the broader transnational environment, and 
are ultimately subject to pressures to respect all human rights (e.g. Brownell, 2012). More specifically, 
various SASAC SOEs (e.g. PetroChina, Sinopec Group, China Mobile Communications Corporation) 
are members of the UNGC, a transnational CSR initiative that, amongst other things, encourages MNCs 
(and other businesses) to respect all human rights (see table 1 below). Further, Chinese SOEs are 
commonly subject to pressure from transnational human rights activists. China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), for example, remains subject to considerable pressure from transnational activists 
concerned to promote all human rights given their controversial (and continuing) activities in Sudan 
(e.g. Patey, 2007, 2009). On the other hand, because SASAC SOEs are commonly not involved in more 
specific sector-focused human rights multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g. the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights which is directed towards the extractives sector; the Global Network 
Initiative, which is directed towards information and communication technology MNCs), they are 
arguably subject to less transnational human rights pressures than some of their foreign counterparts 
(see Chan, Lee & Chan, 2008). 
National Human Rights Pressures 
Whereas SASAC SOEs are subject to transnational pressures that encourage them to acknowledge 
(and somehow promote) all human rights, they are only subject to pressures that encourage them to 
acknowledge some human rights at the national level. The Chinese national population for instance, 
appears to have “a clear preference for stability and economic growth, even if that means postponing 
democracy and tolerating for the time being greater restrictions of civil and political rights” 
(Peerenboom, 2007, p. 156). They also appear to have “a high degree of trust in the ability of the central 
government to manage the problems the country faces” (Fewsmith, 2008, p. 214). 
In addition to the Chinese population arguably having a limited interest in the (national or 
transnational) promotion of all human rights, the CCP has obvious reasons for being more or less 
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opposed thereto. China’s constitution, for example, legitimizes a monist political system that formally 
recognizes “the hegemony of the CCP” (Burns, 1999, p. 581), and is thus opposed to the democratic 
(multi-party) political structures that respect for all human rights entail (e.g. Morsink, 1999). It also 
helps explain why the CCP strongly champions respect for state sovereignty, and is yet to ratify the 
ICCPR (which is the covenant of the International Bill of Rights most readily associated with 
democratic political structures). On the other hand, the fact that the CCP’s political legitimacy relates 
to its furthering a whole host of social and economic rights (e.g. Shambaugh, 2008, p. 168-169), helps 
explain why it has ratified the ICESCR (Whelan, Moon & Orlitzky, 2009, p. 370). 
As with the preceding discussion of Chinese SOEs and transnational human rights pressures, a fuller 
discussion as to why the Chinese party-state only emphasizes some human rights is beyond the scope 
of the present paper. What does need to be noted, however, is that the CSR guidelines that SASAC 
released in 2008 reflect the CCP’s more general concern with economic and social rights, and their 
relative lack of concern with civil and political rights. In particular, it should be emphasized that the 
guidelines:  
1. Never state that Chinese SOEs need to respect all human rights (and never actually mention 
‘human rights’);  
2. Clearly emphasize economic and social rights when they write of labour rights, sustainable 
development and “the socialist harmonious society”, for example;  
3. Understate or ignore the importance of civil and political rights (e.g. they never mention 
‘freedom of association’); and  
4. Link CSR to China’s national interest when they state that the practice of CSR by Chinese 
SOEs will help “China to spread an image as a responsible nation” (SASAC, 2008). 
As these four points indicate, the Chinese national environment differs from the transnational 
environment in that it does not pressure Chinese SOEs to acknowledge the importance of all human 
rights, but only those human rights listed in the ICESCR. 
Intra-Organizational Human Rights Pressures 
In addition to being part of the Chinese national environment, SASAC is part of an intra-
organizational environment that is comprised of itself and the SOEs it nominally owns. Further to 
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various other mechanisms controlled by the CCP, such as the nomenklatura system of hierarchically 
appointing party personnel (Downs, 2008: 123-124; McGregor, 2010: 72) and various accounting and 
financial bodies (Noronha et al., 2013), SASAC strives to ensure that managerial decision-making 
within China’s most important SOEs is aligned with CCP interests (Chan, 2009, p. 50; Downs, 2008, 
p. 125).  SASAC thus occupies the top position of the Chinese SOE intra-organizational environment. 
SOE HQs occupy the second level. These SOEs are 100% owned by the Chinese party-state (and 
nominally owned by SASAC). Just as with SASAC, the leading managers of China’s parent SOEs are 
nearly always leading members of the CCP who have previously been employed in various party-state 
roles. When it is felt that these leaders somehow undermine CCP interests (or those of powerful 
opponents within the CCP), they are ‘dealt with’ accordingly. Thus, Jiang Jiemin (the former director 
of SASAC and full member of the CCP 18th Central Committee, CEO of CNPC and Chairman of 
PetroChina www.chinavitae.com),  was recently sacked as a result of corruption charges in an effort to 
eliminate “vested interests in state-owned industries [that] have long been seen as opposed to economic 
reform…” (BBC, 2013). 
Finally, the immediate subsidiaries of the SOE HQs lie at the third level of the intra-organizational 
environment. Although these subsidiaries are commonly listed on foreign stock exchanges, their HQs 
hold the vast majority of their shares, and they are often managed by the same people that head the 
parent company. Given that the subsidiaries of Chinese SOE HQs also commonly have their own 
subsidiaries, we note that we do not include them in our analysis here. 
More generally, a key benefit of conceiving the Chinese SOE intra-organizational environment in 
terms of these three levels, is that it highlights that SASAC SOEs are part of a national-intra-
organizational hybrid environment that is ultimately controlled by the CCP’s leading body, the 
Politburo Standing Committee (e.g. Shambaugh, 2008; Shirk, 1993). Furthermore, it highlights that this 
environment is overlaid with “formal authority structure[s]” (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008, p. 998) that 
seek to ensure the influence of CCP interests at every opportunity. 
Method 
To examine whether or not China’s SASAC SOEs are more influenced by their transnational, 
national, and/or intra-organizational environments, the authors analysed human rights related 
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disclosures  within documents and websites published by China’s ten most ‘internationalised’ parent 
SOEs (as measured by their 2006 outward stock of foreign direct investment - OECD, 2008), and their 
thirty-four immediate and listed subsidiaries (OECD, 2008).  As depicted in Table 1, 8 of the 44 SOEs 
analysed are members of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) – an initiative encouraging 
corporations to respect all human rights inter alia.  
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
As human rights can be considered a key element of both CSR and sustainable development (e.g. 
the UNGC; McGoldrick, 1996), the SOE’s CSR/sustainability reports from 2007-2010, and relevant 
sections of their websites (in both English and Chinese), were reviewed for evidence of explicit and 
implicit reference to human rights.  The use of company reports to analyse CSR actions and intentions 
is a key source of data for researchers (e.g. Chapple and Moon, 2005), and so too are corporate websites, 
which are increasingly used to detail CSR activities and outputs (Hamann, Sinha, Kapfudzaruwa, & 
Schild, 2009; Noronha et al., 2013). Whilst corporate reports are not necessarily accurate, and can be 
subject to bias, public relations spin, and so on (Muthuri and Gilbert, 2011), the risks of inaccuracy are 
mitigated by the fact that corporate reports are publicly scrutinised, and that it can be in a company’s 
reputational or branding interests to avoid making false claims, and to uphold basic reporting standards 
(Chapple and Moon, 2005; Hamann, et al., 2009). 
To determine the nature and extent of reported human rights concern, the authors conducted a 
content analysis of the SOEs’ CSR/sustainability reports and websites with regard to 33 separate human 
rights derived from the ICCPR and ICESCR (see Tables 3a & 3b below) and the ‘Human Rights 
Translated’ guide (Castan Centre, 2008).  To enable a systematic review of the evidence, the authors 
developed key indicators (see Table 2 for some examples) under four categories: i) Policies: e.g. 
evidence of defined commitments and parameters of engagement with regard to each human rights; ii) 
Processes: e.g. evidence of management systems, training, and/or stakeholder-engagement processes 
related to each human rights issue; iii) Monitoring and Accountability: e.g. evidence of impact 
assessments; and iv) Reporting and Communication: e.g. evidence of reports that are comprehensive 
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and material. Importantly, the same reported concern was sometimes considered relevant to more than 
one human right (for human rights often overlap).   
The reported concerns were rated in terms of whether or not they provided convincing evidence with 
regard to each of the four categories. Thus, a score of 1 was awarded for evidence of policies; 2 for 
policies and processes; 3 for policies, processes, and monitoring and accountability; and 4 for policies, 
processes, monitoring and accountability, and reporting and communication.  Hence, the score range of 
0 to 4 depicts the extent of disclosure on each of the human rights.  The rating procedure was completed 
independently by each of the authors and a research assistant, and any discrepancies discussed and 
reconciled. The companies were then ranked based on their total human rights score (see table 4 below).  
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The research findings are organized in terms of Chinese SOE’s reported concern with civil and 
political rights, and their reported concern with economic, social and cultural rights. Following this, the 
drivers and motives that Chinese SOEs report upon, and that contextualize their reported human rights 
concerns, are identified. 
Civil and Political Rights 
The Civil and Political Rights listed in the ICCPR refer to such things as equality before the law, 
freedom from servitude, and the right to freedom of conscience and public participation. They tend to 
be more ‘negative’ than the economic, social and cultural rights listed in the ICESCR as they ‘only’ 
require the absence of coercion or restraint. Whilst primarily directed towards states, all civil and 
political rights can be impacted upon by businesses in a more or less direct fashion.  For example, 
although it is unlikely that companies can directly impact upon the right to recognition as a person 
before the law, businesses can be complicit in abuses of this right by third parties (e.g. if they indirectly 
benefit from, or support, property acquisition laws that treat the property of women as the property of 
their husbands).   
As to what the SOEs reported, the information disclosed on civil and political rights tended to be 
broad and lacking in detail. Further, and as is evidenced by their not being included in Table 3a, none 
of the SOEs referred to eight civil and political rights, namely: the right of detained persons to humane 
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treatment; the right of aliens to due process when facing expulsion; the right to a fair trial; the right to 
be free from retroactive criminal law; the right to recognition as a person before the law; the rights of 
protection of the family and the right to marry; the rights to freedom from war propaganda, and freedom 
from incitement to racial, religious or national hatred; and the right to not be subject to imprisonment 
for inability to fulfill a contract.  
The group of civil and political rights that generated the next lowest scores were generally reported 
upon in an overlapping and vague fashion. They included the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment; the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour; the 
rights to life, liberty and security of person; the right to freedom of movement; the rights to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; the right to freedom of assembly; the right to equality before the law, 
equal protection of the law; and the rights of minorities. Of the 44 SOEs, no more than 10 reported on 
any one of these eight rights, and the reports that were made with regard thereto, tended to be broad 
statements of intention or commitment. 
In terms of religious freedom, for example, the SOEs referred to such things as employment practices 
that were religiously non-discriminatory more than they did to the actual capacity to practice religion 
(e.g. through providing space for worship).  Thus, the likes of Sinopec Group state that their “Chinese 
employees fully respect the religious belief and habits of foreign counterparts” 
(www.sinopecgroup.com), and CNOOC that it respects “differences and diversity in gender, age, 
disease, race and religion. [And that it…] ensure[s] no system and practices have discrimination 
tendencies” (2007 Sustainability Report, p.48). Moreover, only a handful of companies (e.g. COSCO 
Group,  COSCO Shipping Company) went beyond statements of intention or commitment regarding 
the eight human rights listed above, and reported upon the existence of policies, processes, and/or 
systems, in which specific roles and responsibilities were detailed (e.g. the role and responsibilities of 
security guards in armed conflicts).  
Around a third of the SOEs paid attention to each of the right to privacy; the right to freedom of 
association; the rights of protection for the child; and the right to participate in public life. Most of these 
rights, however, were reported on at a low level (as represented by the predominance of 1s and 2s in 
these table columns). Further, the reported concern with these rights focused on employees, trade-union 
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related structures, and processes facilitating freedom of association and collective bargaining (these 
points are further discussed in the following section).  
The remaining civil and political rights were each reported on by more than 50% of the SOEs. This 
last group includes the right to self-determination; the right to non-discrimination; the right to life; and 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression.  At the most general level, the first of these rights – the 
Right to self-determination (which, like the right to non-discrimination, is also contained in the 
ICESCR) – refers to the right “of peoples to determine their political status and… place in the 
international community” (Castan Centre, 2008: 3). The authors found evidence of policies and 
processes of stakeholder and community consultation over various issues (e.g. local resources and land 
usage) to constitute a general concern with self-determination. However, the authors also found no 
evidence of SOEs consulting with traditional peoples (or minority populations) in ways that would 
enable some sort of national independence (or sovereignty). 
Reported concern with the right to non-discrimination was generally quite low. Nevertheless, some 
of the SOEs went into relative detail. In particular, COSCO Group (2008 Sustainable Development 
Report, p. 152) noted that “Among 130 members of top management of second-tier companies, 9 are 
females…; six are aged below 40…; two are non-party members…; one is of minority nationality… 
[and that] COSCO Group has 4,188 foreign employees, of which, 1,665 are females, accounting for 
40.9%”.  By way of contrast, many of the SOEs performed better in terms of their reported concern 
with the right to life (e.g. their various occupational health and safety and product safety standards) and 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Given various reported incidences in the popular media 
on violations regarding these rights in China more generally (e.g. Noronha et al., 2013: 29), however, 
these scores are likely to be over-stated.  
To conclude this first section of analysis, the findings reveal that not one of the SOEs scored the 
maximum of 4 for any of the civil and political rights, and that the right to life and the right to non-
discrimination received the highest average scores of ~1.7 each. More generally, most SOEs only had 
evidence of policies and/or processes in place for the majority of civil and political rights that they 
reported concern with, and there was negligible evidence of monitoring and accountability (and none 
for reporting and communication). 
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-- Insert Table 3a about here -- 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
In contrast to civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights tend to be more ‘positive’: 
for they require the possession of specific goods (and not just negative freedom from constraint, and/or, 
the restraint of potential infringers). The economic, social and cultural right to enjoy just and favourable 
conditions of work was the most reported upon of the ICESCR rights, and the most reported upon right 
overall. It received a total score of 105 points, which amounts to 60% of the 176 points possible (see 
table 3b). This right relates to a broad range of provisions, such as remuneration, working hours, 
workplace violence and harassment, paid holiday (including maternity/paternity leave), period rest at 
work, type of work (e.g. part- or full-time). The analysis revealed that all 44 SOEs expressed their 
commitment to provide employees with just and favourable working environments, and that SOEs made 
policy statements related to employees’ entitlement to a ‘living wage’ (which, in turn, was commonly 
linked to the paying of a minimum wage). Although companies mentioned leave days, very few 
disclosed their vacation structures and/or systems in detail. COSCO Group provided one exception by 
detailing its vacation structure in its 2010 sustainability report (p.263), and by noting the number of 
days employees were entitled to take under various categories: e.g., maternity leave (90 days), marriage 
leave (3 days), paternity leave (15 days), funeral leave (3 days). 
The right to non-discrimination (discussed above) was also reported on by all 44 SOEs. In contrast 
to the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions at work, which received 105 (60%) of the total points 
possible, it received a total of 76 (43% of 176). 93% of the SOEs reported on the right to education, 
91% on the right to health, 84% on the right to social security and the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and 70% on the right to self-determination (which we have discussed above once again). The 
initiatives reported on in these regards were both inward facing (i.e. related to employees) and outward 
facing (i.e. related to the general public). To provide some further specifics, we note that reported 
concerns with the right to health, tended to focus on physical health and working conditions. 
Nevertheless, China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL) also reported on the mental health of its workers 
when it stated that: 
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“In addition to physical health, COSL also cares about staff’s psychological health.  It provides 
staff with psychological health tutorials with the help from members of the Association of 
Psychological Health, State Professional Psychological Consultants (2010 Social responsibility, 
www.cosl.com.cn)   
Whilst less often reported on, it was not uncommon for SOEs to refer to the more general right to 
work, and the right to form trade unions.  45% of SOEs for instance, claimed that workers had the right 
to join trade unions, and emphasized that employees had avenues for consultations through such 
structures as ‘Labour Union Committees’ and ‘Employee Representative Congresses’.  Nevertheless, 
the SOEs did not disclose information related specifically to the right to strike. This lacuna, however, 
is not altogether surprising: for SOEs are widely reported to have discouraged strikes and to have 
intimidated workers previously (e.g. Downs, 2008). Furthermore, any mention of the right to form trade 
unions needs to be qualified by the fact that independent trade unions remain illegal in China. 
Whilst the relatively low reporting of the right to take part in cultural life is perhaps not surprising, 
the relatively low levels of reporting on the right to a family life are somewhat out of sync with the 
emphasis on just work conditions. Nevertheless, a number of companies did report that they had 
maternity leave policies pegged just over the government’s 14 weeks maternity leave allowance. 
Further, the likes of CNPC, CIMC, and CNOOC Group provided maternity insurance; and COSCO 
Group reported that they had implemented appropriate working environments for pregnant and lactating 
female employees (2010 Sustainable Development Report, p. 290). 
To conclude the analysis of economic, social and cultural rights, it is noted that a number of SOEs 
reported the highest possible level of concern (i.e. 4 points) for the right to enjoy just and favorable 
conditions of work, and that this right received an average score of ~2.4 (the highest of all the human 
rights). Further, and whereas the average score reported for all of the ICCPR rights that were actually 
reported on was ~0.6 (i.e. excluding the 8 ICCPR rights that were not once referred to), the overall 
average for all of the ICESCR rights was double at ~1.2. 
-- Insert table 3b about here -- 
Why Chinese SOEs Report on Human Rights:  Motives and Drivers  
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Just as states and private corporations can potentially be motivated to encourage or engage in CSR 
activities for a variety of reasons (e.g. Aguilera at al., 2007), so too can SOEs.  This section thus 
addresses whether or not the reported human rights concerns of the SOEs can be linked to transnational, 
national, and/or intra-organizational drivers.  
Transnational human rights pressures: As table 4 summarizes, only 7 of the SOEs managed to 
achieve more than 25% of the total points possible for their reported concern with all of the human 
rights (i.e. 33 or more of the 132 possible). Nevertheless, of these 7, 4 were active UNGC members, 
and one (i.e. CMCC), a non-communicating UNGC member. The highest score of 53 (40%) was 
achieved by the parent SOE COSCO, a UNGC member.  Notably, and whilst three UNGC members 
scored less than 25% of the total score possible (Petrochina Company Limited: 24%, CNOOC: 21%, 
and Sinochem International Corporation: 16%), all of the UNGC SOEs were placed in the top half of 
the table.  Further, all of the SOEs with scores totalling 23% or more (i.e. the top 10 performers), were 
involved in shipping (part of the COSCO Group), petroleum (part of the Sinopec, CNPC or CNOOC 
groups), or telecommunications (part of the China Mobile Group).   
-- Insert Table 4 about here – 
It was interesting that talk of human rights was occasionally framed in the language of the ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ framework, even though Ruggie’s framework was rarely referred to explicitly. 
COSCO Group, for example, wrote that: 
“Recognition and respect for human rights are essential to the rule of law and social justice and 
equity, and are fundamental to basic social systems such as the judicial system. States have the 
responsibility and obligation to respect, protect and practice human rights. Organizations are 
obligated to respect human rights, including respect for human rights within their sphere of 
influence.” (COSCO Group 2010 Sustainability Report, p. 93; emphasis ours).  
In a similar fashion, some companies that are not UNGC members refer to the 10 UNGC principles 
in their sustainability reports, and give guidance on where various UNGC principles are reported upon 
(e.g. China Mobile Ltd 2009 Sustainability Report). Further, many of the SOEs appeared mindful of 
the need to comply with international regulations more generally.  For example: 
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“In 2008, COSCO Group has received “International Ship and Port Safety Rules” (ISPS) checks 
for 774 times, passing rate reached 100%. Since COSCO Group ships docked at various countries 
with different customs and conditions, crews are required to strictly follow ISPS rules, 
conscientiously study and grasp the non-invasive security check operation. It was required not 
to miss any clues, and to avoid being accused of violations of human rights” (2008 Sustainable 
Development Report, p. 143, emphasis ours).  
Most SOEs also professed concern to discharge duties associated with various ‘soft’ international 
instruments that have been (officially or unofficially) sanctioned by the CCP (e.g. the International 
Labor Organization Convention on child labour and minimum age requirements, various International 
Standard Organization initiatives). Both COSCO Group (2010: 254) and CMCC (2008: 16) for 
example, noted their implementation of ISO standards 17799 and 27001 relating to privacy. Overall, 
whilst the Chinese SOEs reported concern with trans- and inter- national pressures more generally, very 
few of the SOEs acknowledge the importance of conforming to the transnational pressure to respect all 
human rights in particular. 
National human rights pressures: In contrast to transnational human rights pressures, the Chinese 
national government appears to have been a much more important and explicit driver of the SOEs’ 
reported concern with human rights. At the World Economic Forum in Davos 2008, for example, Wang 
Jianzhou, the CEO of CMCC, acknowledged the SOE’s role in helping China’s Public Service Bureau 
access private information on their customers whenever they needed it (The Epoch Times, 2008).  More 
generally, the SOEs suggested that their reported concern with human rights was motived by the 
concern to comply with national laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
international conventions endorsed by the Chinese government. For example, PetroChina reports that: 
“We strictly adhere to the Labor Law of the People's Republic of China, Labor Contract Law of 
the People's Republic of China and other relevant regulations of jurisdictions in which our shares 
are listed and we rigorously fulfill international conventions endorsed by the Chinese 
government.”  (Italics in original, 2008 CSR Report: 35).  
In addition to these considerations, almost all of the SOEs reported that it was their duty to support 
government policy on ‘implementing scientific outlook on development’ and ‘building a harmonious 
Page 24 of 42 
 
society’, and expressed their concern to create CSR policies with ‘Chinese characteristics’. China 
Mobile Ltd., for example, stated that:   
“The concepts of “scientific development” and “social harmony” are explicit expectations of 
societal development.  Scientific development emphasizes putting people first, and promotes a 
holistic, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable approach to development; social harmony is 
socialism with Chinese characteristics....” (China Mobile Ltd 2007 CSR Report, p. 25). 
Intra-organisational human rights pressures: Whereas the motivational importance of the Chinese 
government was clearly evident throughout the SOE reports, the importance of SASAC was not so 
explicitly evident. Nevertheless, many companies indicated responsiveness to SASAC initiatives.  For 
example, Sinopec Group (Sustainable Development Report, 2010, pp. 54, 63, 65) noted its concern to 
ensure that it complied with SASAC policies regarding external donations; made a point of its corporate 
website being ranked 3rd in the SASAC annual analysis; and noted that “62 teams and 62 employees of 
Sinopec were awarded the honorary titles of “Red Flag Team” and “Exemplary Employee” by 
SASAC”.  In addition to being consistent with Chinese governmental policy more generally, the manner 
in which the SOEs refer to the need to implement the ‘scientific outlook on development’, to ‘build a 
harmonious society’, and to create CSR policies with ‘Chinese characteristics’, is consistent with the 
previously discussed SASAC guidelines. It should also be noted that just as the SASAC guidelines fail 
to mention human rights at all, so too did many of the SOE reports.  For example, the second highest 
ranked SOE overall, Sinopec Corp., fail to explicitly mention ‘human rights’ once in the body of their 
2010 Sustainable Development Report (but it does mention it three times in a table related to reporting).  
Nevertheless, SASAC’s reference to a ‘human-oriented’ policy may imply some considerations of 
human rights (see also Brownell, 2012). 
In addition to parent and subsidiary SOEs reporting on human rights in a fashion resembling the 
SASAC guidelines, a number of the SOE subsidiaries reported on human rights concerns in a similar 
fashion to their parents. China Mobile Ltd., for example, refers to the 10 UNGC principles in its 
sustainability reports (e.g. 2009) despite not being a member of the UNGC itself. This is likely related 
to the fact that their parent, CMCC, is a member of the UNGC. Similarly, the fact that COSCO Shipping 
Company and China COSCO Holdings Company both ranked in the top 7 companies despite their not 
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being members of the UNGC, is likely related to the fact that their parent SOE, COSCO, was the highest 
ranked SOE overall. This does not mean that SOE subsidiaries only performed relatively strongly when 
their parents did likewise. Indeed, only four of the eight parent SOEs (i.e. CMCC, CRHC, COFCO and 
COSCO) managed to perform better than all of their subsidiaries. 
Discussion 
The preceding analysis reveals three points of particular importance. First, the extent to which the 
Chinese SOEs reported concern with the economic, social and cultural rights listed in the ICESCR 
surpassed their reported concern with the civil and political rights listed in the ICCPR. Indeed, the 
average score the SOEs received for their reported concern for all the ICESCR rights was ~1.2, double 
the ~0.6 average received for their reported concern with those ICCPR rights actually referred to. 
Further, and whereas 8 of the ICCPR rights were not referred to at all, all of the ICESCR rights were 
referred to by at least a few of the SOEs to some minimal extent. It should also be emphasized that 
whilst none of the SOEs received a maximum score of 4 for any of the ICCPR rights, a number of SOEs 
received a score of 4 for the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions of work. This ICESCR right 
also received an average score of ~2.4, the highest of all the rights by some considerable margin – with 
the rights to non-discrimination (an ICCPR and ICESCR right), life (ICCPR), and education (ICESCR) 
being collectively placed second with average scores of ~1.7. In short, the SASAC SOEs reported 
concern with some rather than all human rights. This is consistent with pressures emanating from their 
national and intra-organizational environments (which emphasize the importance of ICESCR rights), 
and less consistent with those at the transnational level (which emphasize all of the ICCPR and ICESCR 
rights).  
Second, the analysis shows that whilst the importance of transnational pressures was somewhat 
muted overall, those SOEs within the UNGC all placed in the top half of performers (see table 4). 
Accordingly, it seems that those SOEs that are more directly exposed to transnational pressures to 
acknowledge the importance of all human rights are more likely to report concerns that tend in this 
direction. Further, some of the SOE subsidiaries that did not themselves have direct connections to the 
transnational pressure to respect all human rights (e.g. COSCO Shipping Company), but that had intra-
organizational connections to a parent SOE that did (e.g. COSCO Group), also performed relatively 
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well. Third, the analysis also highlights that, in absolute terms, the SOEs only reported a low concern 
with human rights generally. Indeed, only ‘the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions of work’ 
received an average of more than half the maximum score possible. 
Together, these three points suggest that the idea that MNCs are commonly subject to national and 
intra-organizational pressures that contribute to their resisting transnational pressures with regard to 
CSR issues more generally (Aguilera et al., 2008; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008), also holds with regard 
to human rights issues in particular situations. The findings also shed light on Ruggie’s (2008: para. 32) 
suggestion that states should find it easier to “induce a rights-respecting corporate culture… in State-
owned enterprises.” In particular, they suggest that states can pick and choose between the rights that a 
state-owned enterprise’s culture respects. More generally, and contra those who suggest that 
‘globalization’ is contributing to a significant decrease in state capacities (critically, see Whelan, 2012: 
713-715), the findings suggest that at least certain states, and notably China, remain potent actors. 
The findings also point towards the ways in which national pressures can contribute to the emergence 
of novel or idiosyncratic CSR ideals and terminology. For example, the manner in which many of the 
SOEs wrote of their concern to promote the ‘scientific outlook on development’, to ‘build a harmonious 
society’, and to create CSR policies and practices with ‘Chinese characteristics’, is clearly linked to 
national level CCP ideologies (see Shambaugh, 2008, chapter 6). Furthermore, the manner in which 
SASAC (2008) link CSR performance to China’s global reputation “as a responsible nation”, (SASAC, 
2008), suggests that these developments link to national understandings of foreign affairs (Gond, Kang 
& Moon, 2011: 656; Knudsen, Moon & Slager, 2015).  
More broadly, the findings suggest that if the Chinese party-state can induce a reported concern with 
specific human rights amongst its SOEs, then perhaps it can do so with other business as well. There is 
a line of thought within international relations scholarship, for example, which suggests that those states 
that control the biggest markets (amongst other things), also control the rules of the inter- or trans- 
national business environment (e.g. Drezner, 2007). Accordingly, the CCP may be able to wield greater 
influence over CSR policies and practices within their own national environment, and within the 
transnational environment more generally, if the Chinese economy continues to grow. 
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Whilst these findings are theoretically and practically important for all of the reasons just mentioned, 
they are also constrained by a number of limitations. In the first instance, the findings are limited by 
their being focused on the reported human rights concerns of Chinese SOEs. Thus, and whilst the 
concentration on reported human rights concerns is valid, it cannot be denied that actual policies and 
practices can be de-coupled (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) from those that are reported upon. To quickly 
illustrate the importance of this constraint, we note that our analysis of CNOOC Ltd. does not account 
for public media reports that the SOE has dispossessed Burmese peoples of land and undermined their 
right to self-determination (e.g. The Shwe Gas Bulletin, 2008, 2009). Similarly, in analyzing China 
Mobile Ltd.’s reported concern with the right to self-determination, no account has been made of public 
media reports that the SOE deliberately cut off telecommunications to the Sichuan province where many 
Tibetan nationals are located (Kyodo News, 2009). 
In addition to the preceding constraint, it is noted that the present findings are limited by the 
deliberate focus on one specific business form (i.e. the state-owned enterprise), and on one home 
country (i.e. China).  Amongst other things then, the lack of an international comparative perspective – 
where the reported human rights concerns of SOEs from different home states are analyzed – means 
that the capacity to generalize t findings is limited. The fact that no effort has been made to account for 
specific industrial considerations also limits the extent to which the findings can be generalized. And 
finally, the limited discussion of the broader context within which the CCP came to power, and within 
which Chinese SOEs have emerged, means that such important considerations as the changing nature 
of SOE-employee relations upon the reported human rights concerns of Chinese SOEs, have been 
excluded from the present analysis (e.g. Hassard, Sheehan & Yuxin, 2008).  
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the tendency to overlook the potential for MNCs to be subject to 
conflicting human rights pressures is rendered increasingly problematic by the growing global 
prominence of Chinese SOEs. More specifically, a framework that differentiates between human rights 
pressures at three levels of analysis (i.e. at the transnational, national, and intra-organizational levels 
respectively) has been constructed, and used to analyse the reported human rights concerns of Chinese 
SOEs. The paper’s main finding is that, in predominantly reporting a concern with only some human 
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rights (i.e. those contained within the ICESCR), Chinese SOEs appear more influenced by pressures at 
the national and intra-organizational level, and less influenced by transnational pressures that encourage 
them to report their concern with all human rights (i.e. those contained within the ICCPR and ICESCR). 
The findings and analysis suggest a number of streams of future research. First, they highlight the 
need for more detailed and targeted analyses of Chinese SOEs with regard to human rights. Amongst 
other things, such work might look into how the different strategic considerations, and different 
industrial settings, of the various SOEs, impacts upon their differing reported concern with human 
rights. Further, the findings and analysis suggest the need to empirically investigate the extent to which 
the human rights concerns that the SOEs report upon are evident in actual policies and practices. 
The paper also points towards the need for research that investigates the ways in which Chinese 
SOEs might help or hinder the development of those multi-stakeholder networks and/or international 
accountability standards (IASs) they do (or do not) participate within (Gilbert, Rasche & Waddock, 
2011). How, for example, does the participation of PetroChina in the UNGC impact upon the legitimacy 
of the UNGC given that its parent, and non-UNGC member, CNPC, continues to be accused of 
supporting a Sudanese government accused of genocide? (Investors Against Genocide website). On the 
other hand, how does the non-participation of Chinese SOEs in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (Chan, Lee & Chan 2008: 13-14) diminish (or contribute to) it? Furthermore, and given the 
paper’s focus on SOEs social disclosure, it would be interesting to see how the Global Reporting 
Initiative has impacted upon Chinese SOEs, and vice-versa. 
The findings also point towards the need for comparative scholarship. Specifically, the framework 
and methods here detailed provide a basis from which to begin establishing how different national and 
intra-organizational pressures impact upon the extent to which different businesses report concern with 
(or are actually concerned with) human rights. Clearly, such work is important to those who wish to 
build upon, add to, or more fully implement, Ruggie’s (2011) Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.  
Finally, the paper suggests two broad and overlapping lines of research that are deserving of 
considerable attention. First, there is a need to develop the fledgling literature on CSR and China (e.g. 
Moon & Shen, 2010; Noronha et al. 2013). This could be done, for example, through more fully 
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exploring the political-economic and normative considerations that inform the various CCP ideologies 
that the Chinese SOEs and SASAC are linking to CSR. Further, it would be very interesting for future 
work to look into whether or not the growing might of China and Chinese SOEs is having any impact 
on human rights pressures at the transnational level, and within other countries. This last line of research 
would likely prove of considerable interest throughout the social sciences.  
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Figure 1 – A Three-Level Framework of Human Rights Pressures  
 
 
  
Page 38 of 42 
 
Table 1 – SOEs’ Transnational Membership to the UN Global Compact 
Parent Company 
SOE Subsidiary 
 Sector Transnational Membership 
China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) Oil & Gas UN Global Compact since 01/10/2009 (Status: Active) 
 China Petroleum and Chemical Company(Sinopec 
Corp) 
Oil & Gas UN Global Compact since 22/05/2004 (Status: Active) 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Oil & Gas  
  
Petrochina Company Ltd 
 
Oil & Gas 
UN Global Compact since 01/08/2007 (Status: Active) 
China Mobile Communications Corporation Telecommunications  UN Global Compact since 16/07/2007 (Status: Non-communicating) 
 China Mobile Ltd 
 
Telecommunications  
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Oil & Gas UN Global Compact since 25/06/2008 (Status: Active) 
 China Blue Chemical Ltd Oil & Gas  
 CNOOC Ltd Oil & Gas  
 China Offshore Oil Engineering Co., Ltd (COOEC) Oil & Gas  
 China Oilfield Services (COSL) 
 
 
Oil & Gas 
 
China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO) Shipping & Logistics UN Global Compact since 25/01/2005 (Status: Active) 
 
China COSCO Holdings Company 
 
Shipping & Logistics 
 
 COSCO Corporation (Singapore) Diversified - Shipping  
 COSCO (HK) Shipping Company Co., Ltd Shipping   
 COSCO Pacific Ltd Financial Services  
 China International Marine Containers (CIMC) Group Industrial Transportation UN Global Compact since 08/04/2004 (Status: Active) 
 Sino-Ocean Land Company 
 
Real Estate  
Sinochem Group Chemicals UN Global Compact since 01/10/2009 (Status: Active) 
 Sinochem International Corporation Chemicals   
 Sinofert Holdings Ltd Agriculture  
 Franshion Properties (China) Ltd 
 
Real Estate  
China Merchants Group Commercial Services  
 China Merchants Holding (International) Co., Ltd Diversified  
 China Merchants Energy Shipping Co., Ltd 
 
Transportation  
China Resources (Holdings) Co. Limited Investment Holding & 
Property Investments 
 
 China Resources Enterprise Ltd Conglomerate  
 China Resources Land Ltd Real Estate Investment  
 China Resources Power Holdings Ltd Utilities - Electric  
 China Resources Gas Holdings Ltd Gas  
 China Resources Microelectronics 
 
Technology  
CITIC Group Corporation  Financial Services  
 
CITIC Bank Corporation 
 
Financial - Banking 
 
 CITIC Securities Co., Ltd Financial - Banking  
 CITIC Resources Holdings Ltd Diversified  
 Asia Satellite Telecommunications Holdings Ltd Telecommunications  
 CITIC Pacific Ltd. 
 
Steel  
COFCO Food Processing  
 China Foods Limited  Food Processing  
 COFCO Property (Group) Real Estate  
 China Agri-Industries Holdings Ltd Agriculture  
 COFCO TunHe Food Processing  
 COFCO Biochemical (Anhui) Agriculture  
 MengNiu Dairy 
 
Food & Beverage  
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Table 2 - Examples of Human Rights Issues and Related Indicators 
 
Human Right Issue 
Indicators of evidence of expressions or reference to Human Rights 
(HRs) 
 
Non discrimination 
(A labour right which 
includes equality at work & 
equal pay for equal work) 
 
 The company has commitments not to discriminate on the basis of 
gender, disability, ethnic or racial status, age, religion, caste, sexual 
orientation, union membership, political affiliation, HIV/Aids, 
parental status 
 The company has constituted management systems to ensure that 
hiring, placement, remuneration, training are based on objective 
factors and are implemented in non-discriminatory ways 
 Company conducts impact assessment to determine risks to 
employees and the company, and acts on the findings 
 Company has a system of reporting and monitoring incidents of 
discrimination and actions taken.  The company uses external 
auditors or other assurance processes to verify reported information 
 
 
Right to Health 
(Both a labour right if 
related to workplace health 
& safety; and also to 
Physical and Mental 
Health; and a non-labour 
right if it goes beyond 
employees to include other 
programs with other 
stakeholders) 
 
 Company has effective health and safety prevention and 
remediation policies in place which comply with industry, national 
and international standards  
 Company has in place management systems, health and safety 
procedures to protect employees against unhealthy, toxic or 
harmful processes, substances and techniques 
 Company routinely monitors its production processes, machinery 
and equipment to ensure that they are safe and in good working 
conditions.  It conducts impact assessment and acts on its findings 
 Company has health & safety reporting and monitoring systems.  It 
uses external auditors or other assurance processes to verify 
reported information 
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Table 3a – Chinese SOEs’ Reported Concern with Rights listed in the ICCPR 
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%
)
28
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)
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h
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at
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n
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 M
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 C
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e
rs
 (
C
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C
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G
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u
p
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
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%
)
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 C
o
m
p
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y
2
2
3
3 
(1
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)
7 
(1
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)
C
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u
p
 C
o
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o
ra
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o
n
1
2
3
1
1
1
6 
(3
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)
9 
(1
4%
)
C
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C
o
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o
ra
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o
n
1
1
2 
(1
3%
)
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)
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e
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e
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C
o
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1
1
1
2
2
2
6 
(3
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)
9 
(1
4%
)
C
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e
so
u
rc
e
s 
H
o
ld
in
gs
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1
1
2 
(1
3%
)
2 
(3
%
)
C
IT
IC
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a 
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te
ll
it
e
 
1
1
1
3 
(1
9%
)
3 
(5
%
)
C
IT
IC
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if
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 L
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1
1
1
3 
(1
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)
3 
(5
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)
C
O
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O
1
3
3
1
1
5 
(3
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)
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(1
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C
h
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a 
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o
d
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Li
m
it
e
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1
3
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)
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O
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O
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p
e
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u
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)
1
1 
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)
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(2
%
)
C
h
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u
st
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1
1
3
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)
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O
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n
H
e
1
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O
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o
 B
io
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e
m
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A
n
h
u
i)
1
2
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)
3 
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%
)
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n
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 D
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1
1
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(1
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)
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)
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n
o
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m
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u
p
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
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)
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)
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n
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at
io
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 C
o
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o
ra
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n
2
1
2
1
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2
6 
(3
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)
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)
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n
o
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o
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1
1
2
1
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1
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2
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)
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n
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p
e
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h
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td
1
1
1
3 
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)
3 
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)
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h
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M
e
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h
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1
2
2
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1
1
7 
(4
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)
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 (
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%
)
C
h
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a 
M
e
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h
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o
ld
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g 
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n
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at
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n
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 C
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1
2
1
2
2
2
6 
(3
8%
)
10
 (
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%
)
C
h
in
a 
M
e
rc
h
an
ts
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n
e
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y 
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ip
p
in
g 
C
o
.,
 L
td
2
2
1
2
1
2
6 
(3
8%
)
10
 (
16
%
)
To
ta
l C
o
u
n
t 
(M
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. 4
4)
31
 (
70
%
)
44
 (
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)
36
 (
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%
)
2 
(5
%
)
10
 (
23
%
)
5 
(1
1%
)
2 
(5
%
)
14
 (
32
%
)
6 
(1
4%
)
24
 (
55
%
)
6 
(1
4%
)
15
 (
34
%
)
14
 (
32
%
)
12
 (
27
%
)
9 
(2
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)
10
 (
23
%
)
To
ta
l S
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 (
M
ax
. 1
76
)
38
 (
22
%
)
76
 (
43
%
)
74
 (
42
%
)
3 
(2
%
)
16
 (
9%
)
9 
(5
%
)
2 
(1
%
)
25
 (
14
%
)
8 
(5
%
)
39
 (
22
%
)
9 
(5
%
)
22
 (
13
%
)
23
 (
13
%
)
23
 (
13
%
)
19
 (
11
%
)
12
 (
7%
)
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Table 3b – Chinese SOE Reported Concern with Rights listed in the ICESCR 
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P
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at
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at
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b
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R
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ca
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d
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 p
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at
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ra
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ra
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ad
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 C
h
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 C
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o
ra
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 (
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c 
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)
1
2
2
4
2
2
2
1
3
1
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 (
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%
)
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 (
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%
)
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C
o
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1
3
2
4
1
2
2
2
1
3
2
11
 (
10
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)
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52
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)
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N
at
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o
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 C
o
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o
ra
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o
n
 (
C
N
P
C
)
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
8 
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)
16
 (
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%
)
P
e
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o
ch
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a 
C
o
m
p
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m
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e
d
2
3
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
9 
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)
20
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%
)
C
h
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a 
N
at
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 O
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 C
o
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o
ra
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o
n
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C
N
O
O
C
)
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3
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2
2
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1
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%
)
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h
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 C
h
e
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1
2
3
2
2
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)
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 (
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%
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C
 L
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3
1
3
2
2
2
1
3
2
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%
)
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 (
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%
)
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h
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n
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 (
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)
1
2
2
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1
1
2
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)
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)
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h
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ld
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s 
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O
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)
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3
2
3
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2
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)
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)
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e
so
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1
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1
1
1
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)
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2
1
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R
e
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e
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1
1
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2
2
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)
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)
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h
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e
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u
rc
e
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o
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1
2
1
1
1
1
6 
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)
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)
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h
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R
e
so
u
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e
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M
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e
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n
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s
1
2
1
1
1
1
6 
(5
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)
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(1
6%
)
C
h
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a 
M
o
b
il
e
 C
o
m
m
u
n
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n
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C
o
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o
ra
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o
n
 (
C
M
C
C
)
1
3
2
4
3
3
2
1
3
1
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 (
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%
)
23
 (
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%
)
C
h
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a 
M
o
b
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e
 L
td
1
3
2
4
3
3
2
1
3
9 
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)
22
 (
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%
)
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h
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O
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h
ip
p
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ro
u
p
 (
C
O
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O
)
2
3
3
4
1
3
3
4
2
2
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)
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)
C
h
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C
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O
 H
o
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 C
o
m
p
an
y
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
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 (
10
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)
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 (
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)
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o
rp
o
ra
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 (
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n
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)
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
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(6
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)
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 (
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%
)
C
O
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O
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it
e
d
1
2
1
1
1
1
6 
(5
5%
)
7 
(1
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)
C
O
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O
 S
h
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p
in
g 
C
o
m
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y
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
9 
(8
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)
14
 (
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%
)
C
h
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e
 C
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n
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 (
C
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C
) 
G
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u
p
1
2
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3
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2
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2
2
11
 (
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)
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 (
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%
)
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o
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o
m
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y
2
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
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)
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 (
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)
C
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o
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o
ra
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n
1
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)
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C
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1
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1
1
1
1
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e
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1
1
2
2
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2
2
2
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)
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 (
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%
)
C
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e
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u
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e
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H
o
ld
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 L
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1
2
1
1
1
5 
(4
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)
6 
(1
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)
C
IT
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a 
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it
e
 
1
1
2
1
2
1
6 
(5
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)
8 
(1
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)
C
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 P
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if
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 L
td
1
2
2
1
1
2
6 
(5
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)
9 
(2
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)
C
O
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O
1
3
1
3
2
2
2
2
8 
(7
3%
)
16
 (
36
%
)
C
h
in
a 
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o
d
s 
Li
m
it
e
d
 
1
2
2
2
2
2
6 
(5
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)
11
 (
25
%
)
C
O
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O
 P
ro
p
e
rt
y 
(G
ro
u
p
)
1
2
1
1
4 
(3
6%
)
5 
(1
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)
C
h
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A
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d
u
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e
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H
o
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 L
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1
1
2
2
2
1
2
7 
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)
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 (
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)
C
O
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O
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u
n
H
e
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
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(7
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)
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(2
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)
C
O
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o
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e
m
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 (
A
n
h
u
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1
3
2
3
2
2
2
7 
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)
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 (
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)
M
e
n
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 D
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1
1
1
1
1
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(4
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)
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)
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n
o
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e
m
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p
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
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)
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n
o
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m
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at
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 C
o
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o
ra
ti
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2
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3
1
2
1
2
2
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)
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 (
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)
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o
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o
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1
1
3
2
3
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2
3
1
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)
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 (
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%
)
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n
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p
e
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(C
h
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a)
 L
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1
1
2
2
2
1
2
7 
(6
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)
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 (
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%
)
C
h
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M
e
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h
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u
p
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
7 
(6
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)
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 (
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%
)
C
h
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a 
M
e
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h
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  H
o
ld
in
g 
(I
n
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at
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n
al
 )
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o
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 L
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1
2
2
2
2
1
6 
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5%
)
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 (
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)
C
h
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a 
M
e
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h
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n
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y 
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p
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g 
C
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2
2
2
2
1
2
2
7 
(6
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)
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 (
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)
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l C
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u
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 (
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)
44
 (
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)
16
 (
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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M
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
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)
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 (
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)
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 (
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)
74
 (
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)
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 (
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)
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)
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 (
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%
)
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 (
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%
)
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Table 4 – Ranking of Chinese SOEs on Reported Concern with Human Rights 
 
H
u
m
an
 R
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P
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p
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